A Sense of Unreality: Flaubert’s Sentimental Education

The sense of dislocation, the feeling of some thin film separating oneself from the real world out in front of us – there is perhaps no more modern feeling than this. One of the many ideas that Flaubert engages with in his Sentimental Education is this one. The novel is a Bildungsroman in the sense that it describes a young man’s education, but an unusual one. This is because Frédéric Moreau’s education is one of disillusionment – in love, in life, in himself. And partly this disillusionment is delivered through the idea that between him and the world he experiences there is something that prevents him from immersing himself in the latter properly.

Flaubert’s novel is strange. At nearly five hundred pages in my edition, it is much longer than his earlier Madame Bovary, and much more diffuse. There are a huge number of characters, many of whose names and identities end up melting into each other (Deslauriers, Dambreuse, Dussardier). The plot, combining the politics of mid-century Paris with Frédéric’s love for several older women, is occasionally hard to follow. Nor is the book sustained by Frédéric himself, who is an idiot at best and a selfish ass at worst. Instead, it is sustained by a feeling of reality itself – of Paris and Parisians, politics, and passion – which strains against the novel’s boundaries.

Flaubert wrote that he was “obliged to push into the background the things which are precisely the most interesting”, due to the sheer complexity of the world he was conjuring up. But in fact, this is misleading, for the sheer complexity of the world is already an argument about how we engage with it. As characters and events speed past, and facts and figures (who has what money, what business, and so on), we find it increasingly hard to hold anything in our head. Everything is changeable, people are always coming and going, so why attempt to stop things? We “go with the flow”, which prevents us from engaging more deeply with things. Perhaps the most prominent symbol in the book related to this is the stock market. The stock market is not a place, it is an idea – fortunes can be won or lost at random and with the speed of the roulette wheel. When Frédéric loses money and gains it so quickly, so effortlessly, there’s a sense of unreality about it. The use of money and complexity distances us from the world – they suggest it’s not worth trying to understand.

This might be termed a bourgeois sensibility, and it lies at the heart of the book. But an older, Romantic, view is little better. At the novel’s beginning Frédéric is a student, sentimental and silly – when he sees Madame Arnoux, who is destined to be the central love of his life, his first thought is that “she looked like the women you read about in romantic novels”. Rather than see the woman for who she is, Frédéric immediately lays down an idea of her that covers her up. A Romantic sensibility, looking eternally for symbols, gets in the way of real things just as much as does the bourgeois sensibility above. Frédéric has read too much, thought too much – he cannot engage. When he faces the violence of the revolutionary years following 1848, he “felt as if he were watching a play”.

Frédéric is a spectator. He is a spectator on life, and in life. Politics barely engages him. Its role initially is slightly absurd – a bit of a scuffle on the streets gets in the way of Frédéric’s illicit liaisons. Later, he is supposed to stand for election, but never gets around to it. His personal fortune allows him never to have to do anything, and so he does nothing. Nothing other than chasing women around Paris, that is. He toys with various artistic ideas that go nowhere. From something of a naïve child at the novel’s beginning by the end he is an experienced womaniser, whose exploits, however uncomfortable they make us, nonetheless reflect great talents – if that is the word we would like to use.

Flaubert’s structural ingenuity also detaches us, and Frédéric, from the world. His story is one of comparisons. We visit bourgeois parties and decadent artistic ones. While etiquette means that these must be different, we realise that there is just as much moral decay and licentiousness in the former as in the latter. The social rules that govern society seem like a poor cover for people’s fundamental similarity. Even the characters, such as Frédéric, seem to float between both types of engagement without rhyme or reason.

Of course, parties are important for another reason. Or rather, they are unimportant. We may recall from the history books the importance of banqueting clubs for fomenting revolutionary feelings, but ultimately having dinner is the opposite of actually acting. People spend the novel talking, walking, but never doing. Frédéric, as mentioned, never really gets a job. The revolution passes people by, providing a reason for sleepless nights and arguments at dinner, but never anything more. Flaubert shows an age of inaction, in comparison to the regular reference point – the Revolution of 1789. Everyone disagrees with the means used, but at least Robespierre and pals did things. The comparison makes the revolution of 1848 seem more like a spectacle than a real event.

Just as the scenes that Flaubert chooses to depict reflect a world where people are not engaged, so too does the superabundance of characters. If there are a great many characters, none of them can plant themselves in our minds as particularly real. Nobody can be a hero, or even remotely heroic, when the spotlight is only ever placed on them for a few minutes at a time. A major character gets ill on one page and dies on the next. At the funeral people forget to show any real sympathy at all.

The novel also, naturally enough, says an awful lot about social structures. I mentioned the stock market earlier, with its random twists and turns. Frédéric’s life, despite the most unbelievably stupidity on his part, never seems to go wrong. The banker, Monsieur Dambreuse, has the most extraordinary tolerance for his young acquaintance’s idiocy, whether it be being seen in public with a woman of ill repute or refusing to turn up to meetings. Although Dambreuse is determined to see that Frédéric succeeds, whether financially or politically, and always helps his protégé when he has trouble, Frédéric tends to blatantly ignore his own friends’ pleas for help. Fate itself seems to be saying to the young aristocrat that the world was made for him, that he needs not to worry. A hint of the self-entitlement I know all too well in myself and my old schoolfriends is ever present in the background. And if we are entitled to the world, we never need to engage with it. Like men standing before a tree with ripe fruits, we know that we need not bother ourselves to pick them – they will fall of their own accord.

The book ends with two extraordinary chapters of complete brutality. Frédéric, the great womaniser, finds himself defeated and alone. And Flaubert skips into the future with wonderfully dead language:

“He travelled the world.

He tasted the melancholy of packet ships, the chill of waking under canvas, the boredom of landscapes and monuments, the bitterness of broken friendship.

He returned home.

He went into society, and he had affairs with other women. They were insipid beside the endless memory of his first love. And then the vehemence of desire, the keen edge of sensation itself, had left him. His intellectual ambitions were fading too. The years went by; and he resigned himself to the stagnation of his mind and the apathy that lived in his heart.”

Frédéric learns that he has done something to himself, something horrible, over the course of the novel. He has destroyed his connection with reality, and now he cannot rebuild it. Life is dead, and Frédéric has killed it. Whereas in Russian literature a figure like Pechorin (in Lermontov’s A Hero of Our Time) comes to us already broken, Flaubert writes the creation of the superfluous man. For that, it is a more terrible read in many ways. When Madame Arnoux, the first love, discovers him again after all these years, we feel an apprehensive shudder. And so we should:

“The lamp, standing on a console table, lit up her white hair. It was like a blow full in the chest”.

Frédéric, even now, cannot face the world. The woman who loves him now needs to be replaced by the image of the woman whom once he loved. And reality itself is left all the poorer for it. Perhaps the most beautiful line in the book comes here: “In every parting there comes a moment when the beloved is already no longer with us.” When we try to picture this sentence, we see the problem I have been trying to describe – two people, and then behind them their spirits, already floating away in different directions. There is no connection, either to each other, or the earth itself.

Flaubert’s story is one of decline, of failure. Like John Williams’ Stoner, which I reread recently, it presents a life where things do not quite go to plan. Or rather, where there is a certain mundane okay-ness about how they turn out. Flaubert does not suggest what the reason might be. When Frédéric and his friend Deslauriers meet again in the very final chapter, they both acknowledge that their respective dreams of love and power have come to nothing. But in considering the reasons, both come up short. Deslauriers says “I was too logical, and you were too sentimental”. We may agree or disagree with this, depending on what we have taken away from the rest of the book. But there is nothing didactic about it. For a novel which has “education” in its title, it doesn’t want to teach. It shows us two bad paths, but no examples of what a “right” path might be.

I venture to suggest that Frédéric’s failure stems partly from a world where a direct connection with things is impossible. This is a sufficiently “weak” concluding argument, in that we can make any suggestion we want for what success would look like or for how Frédéric could reconnect with his surroundings. Manual labour, artistic pursuits, a real love? Take your pick. Whatever we decide, it makes sense to establish the nature of the problem. A sense of dislocation from the world is a feeling that we moderns can never escape – Flaubert’s enduring dramatization of it can teach us how to see it, even if it can’t teach us how to escape it. That is only one of many reasons for reading this amazing work.  

John Stuart Mill: Thinker and Human

I have taught English for several years now to a boy with cerebral palsy. He is about eighteen and he does not get out much. His English is excellent, and he is intelligent, but after several years I am tired out and really do not know what else to teach him. Still, one of the good things that has come from this pairing has been that I have been given an excuse to read authors that I would not otherwise have done. Carlyle is one such author. Another is John Stuart Mill, the noted 19th century British philosopher. We read Utilitarianism and On Liberty some time ago and now we are reading Mill’s Autobiography. In Aileen Kelly’s Herzen Mill was mentioned as one of Herzen’s favourite discoveries, and he was also praised highly by Bertrand Russell (Mill’s godson for a brief year!) – another thinker I was reading recently.

Nevertheless, I had little desire to read Mill, on account of the fact that liberalism is relatively boring. People should be free to do what they want so long as they don’t hurt others – very well. Society can be a pain – indeed it can. Increasing the general happiness is important – really, I had no idea. But Mill is a more complicated thinker than these pithy statements make him out to be, and in particular I found his Autobiography very interesting. For those readers who haven’t seen the point of Mill, I propose to provide a few things I enjoyed in these three works.

On Liberty

The purpose of Mill’s essay is to work out the limits to the power that can legitimately be exercised over the individual by society and government. The tyranny of the “will of the people” is something that Mill faced in his personal life, carrying on an intense friendship with a married woman which created great difficulties for him. The majority or the group that can get others to accept it as the majority will doubtless lead to oppressing the minority, so checks and balances must be created. But where, and of what sort?

The argument, as summarised by Mill, is as follows: “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”

How, on the basis of this argument, can we have a good society? Firstly, by a free press. Secondly, by having as many opinions as possible. This latter suggestion I particularly liked. Mill argues that if the dissenter from popular opinion is wrong, they learn the truth by speaking out. Meanwhile, those who are correct come to appreciate the truth more. And often both sides may share some truth. “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility,” so either way we must always listen to others. Unfortunately, Mill’s views presuppose that arguments are made in good faith, and that people are willing to change their views if proven wrong. I believe the experience of a global pandemic seems to suggest that some people are unwilling to accept alternative viewpoints, whatever the strength of their foundations. (This is a dig at those against vaccinations, not those sceptical of them.)

If we live in fear, we will not speak out. This ultimately destroys independent thought, and the general development of a given community. At the same time, we must all work to “understand the grounds of one’s own opinions”. A free debate cannot proceed unless both sides know their foundations. A view without known foundations cannot be harmed through argument, but it can be terribly harmful.

Happiness is having the freedom to act according to one’s inner light. It consists in being spontaneous – the very thing society tends not to tolerate. Society, often internalised, leads to a “despotism of custom”. Contrary to the suggestion of coldness and rigidity, Mill’s idea of flourishing here is very freeform – “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.”

Liberty ends when harm begins. If we harm others the law must be ready. But if we harm only ourselves, we have only ourselves to blame. The punishment for this is simply a bad reputation, and your friends turning away from you. Once we are adults, we are responsible for our decisions. Nobody can force us to change, or to act in a different way. A big government is unnecessary for Mill because it tends to make of us small people. In the field of human affairs, the government should less prohibit, than act as a guide. A sugar tax, rather than a sugar ban – for example – would be what Mill would propose.

Mill’s essay is marked by a certain gloom. He sees the development of society as leading to a general personal decline into slavish similarity. Communication, commerce, and technological advances have all brought people more in touch with one another, but at the same time they all have reduced the differentiation of the individual. Public opinion, growing ever stronger and more similar, becomes less willing to tolerate dissenting views. Finally, “mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it”. Liberty is lost when homogeneity means nobody has any use for it.

Mill’s piece remains useful today firstly as a reminder of the value of listening to others and understanding the basis of our own opinions, and secondly by arguing for the minimal intrusion of others onto the freedom of the individual. “That the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself”, is a challenging statement that we may not agree with. But it is useful to hear, to turn over in our minds. If for no other reasons that it makes us think upon our own answer to the question of the relationship between society and the individual.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is about right and wrong. The philosophical idea was first put down by Jeremy Bentham, a friend of Mill’s father, in the form of “the greatest-happiness principle”. An action is good if it increases the general happiness, and bad if it doesn’t. This raised some issues, such as whether happy idiots are better-off than less happy intelligent people. It was also a rather cold doctrine, seemingly devaluing the arts in favour of more coarse pleasures such as eating and carousing. These are issues that Mill seeks to address in his essay.

Mill begins by noting that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”. Happiness is desirable as an end, but that does not mean that simple pleasures are the most valuable. He suggests that we are capable of comparing pleasures, and in this way determining which of a given two is better. Having listened to some Mozart and eaten a burger I can decide for myself which I prefer. Now, many people may choose the burger (including, possibly, me). But Mill does not despair at this possibility, instead he draws a distinction between happiness and contentedness.

Contented people are generally stupider, meaning they require less pleasures and less complex pleasures. Intelligent people are more demanding of their pleasures, and also have a desire for more complex ones. Since we know the difference, we can say that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”. But the fool or the pig cannot agree – and nor could we expect them to.

Just as in On Liberty, here too Mill is concerned with the kind of world that allows for human flourishing. In this essay Mill argues that we need sufficient time to develop our tastes for pleasure, otherwise we will lose them. In a mediocre, unfree society, there will be mediocre and boring pleasures and a lower sort of happiness predominating. The present age, for Mill, with its poor education and dreadful social arrangements, does not let us be as happy as we could be, or develop as much as we could.

Education is particularly important for Mill. In On Liberty, he identified it as the period of a person’s life where we can form people’s tastes before they become entirely responsible for themselves. In Utilitarianism, Mill sees education as playing a key role in helping us to harmonise our idea of our own happiness with the general happiness. Through education we can shape our consciences to be more utilitarian, so that we come to see the interests of others as being more equal to our own interests.

Utilitarianism is really annoying because it’s hard to argue against it for a layman like myself. In its modern form, such as propounded by Peter Singer, it’s thoroughly miserable-making. Can I justify having any money at all when I could give it to the poor and make their lives considerably happier? Singer’s Effective Altruism really appears, when thought through, to be the least we can do, and yet it is more than most of us do. Mill and Singer are not the same person, and Mill’s piece is simpler and less demanding.

At the same time, Utilitarianism does still suffer a little from a belief in human rationality. I remember thinking of Dostoevsky while I read it – a man whose writings time and again demonstrate that people can choose suffering over happiness. Mill might argue that Dostoevsky’s characters are made happy by being miserable, and I’m sure many depressed people would concur with the statement that in despair there can often be something sweet.

Thinking about it now, however, I’m not sure a Dostoevskian objection really holds up – what Dostoevsky is fundamentally after is affirming a sense of human dignity, in other words saying that I’m not a pig but a human being. Taking away our dignity by taking away our responsibility for our actions, as do the great systems (including utilitarianism) that his characters rail against, ultimately deprives us of the foundation of our happiness – our freedom. In other words, we can be against utilitarianism while still fitting very snugly into a utilitarian conception of human ends and means. The fact that such a thought would probably bring The Underground Man to suicide does not devalue it – it just suggests we shouldn’t tell him!

Autobiography – The Childhood

Mill’s Autobiography is another interesting text that throws light upon the concerns of the other two essays, both by answering some of our criticisms about them, and by explaining the character of the man who wrote them. John Stuart Mill was an extraordinary character. At the age of 3 he was learning Greek, at the age of 8 he had taught himself Latin. He was writing and being published in the leading newspapers of the day while still a teenager. And the fact that we are reading him today indicates that all this education led to the creation of a formidable thinker, as well as just a precocious child.

Mill’s purpose in the Autobiography is to leave “some record of an education which was unusual and remarkable.” Under his father’s watchful eye, Mill learned everything under the sun. Pushed relentlessly, he learned that “a pupil from whom nothing is ever demanded which he cannot do, never does all he can.” Yet at the same time, the text is riddled with tensions. Mill was allowed no holidays; he had no friends. He felt bitter about being unlike other children, had trouble dressing himself and tying knots. Worse than that, “Mine was not an education of love but of fear.” These thoughts are hidden from sight, exorcised from the text by Mill’s wife and then later by his stepdaughter. His father alternates between awe-inspiring intellectual power and terrible coldness. The result of such an influence was that for a long time Mill lacked confidence and the ability to think for himself.

Mill’s mother does not receive a mention. I had thought perhaps she had died in childbirth, but apparently Mill was the eldest of nine children (they too are barely mentioned). Mill apparently found no warmth in his mother capable of making up for his father’s coolness. And so, stunted by this childhood, Mill developed, learning a great deal, but feeling very little – he considers himself at this time a mere “reasoning machine” – until he reached the age of twenty and had a great and terrible crisis.  

Autobiography – The Crisis

From his birth Mill had been raised to be a reformer of the world, and he had believed wholeheartedly in that goal. “My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object”. Yet one day Mill asks himself whether he’d be happy if he achieved this goal, and he realised that he would not. Finding the end unrewarding, Mill can no longer see any value in the means and pursuing it. Though he continued to write, the light had gone out inside him. He felt desperately lonely, and could confide in no-one, least of all his father. He realised that his analytical abilities had done him just as much harm as good, because they had ruined his ability to feel. They were “a perpetual worm at the root both of the passions and of the virtues”.

Mill escaped from his despair, which was psychological as much as intellectual, through the help of art – he read Wordsworth for the first time. This led him to appreciate that “the internal culture” of an individual is more important than he’d realised. Happiness can lie not just in improving the world, but in art too. Indeed, Mill came to realise that happiness couldn’t be what we strive after – in something vaguely reminiscent of Wittgenstein, he noticed that whenever we asked ourselves if we were happy, we ceased being so. In other words, the resolution to our problems is a dissolution of them. In pursuing another worthwhile goal, Mill thought, “you will inhale happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal questioning”. Suddenly utilitarianism does not seem so restrictive after all.

Autobiography – Harriet

Mrs Harriet Taylor, who later became Mill’s wife, was a married woman when they met in his early twenties. But in spite of this the two struck up an extremely intense and rewarding, and apparently platonic, friendship that lasted until her death in 1858. This friendship was “the honour and chief blessing of my existence” and Mill’s praise for his wife is extraordinary for the intensity of the feeling that it conveys. For Mill, Harriet was essential in making him the mature writer we associate with him. Where he had come to his conclusions about life through cold analysis and study, Harriet had come to the same conclusions through her feelings and empathy. Together, they created works like On Liberty and Utilitarianism, combining both approaches to the problems at hand.

Father’s Death, Political Career

Mill’s Autobiography is primarily a record of the first twenty-five or so years of his life, when all the major developments in his thought are taking place. The rest of his life is simply a long chapter at the end. Of this, aside from the records of what he wrote, the most interesting thing is Mill’s description of his brief stint as an MP.

Mill was put forward by some friends to be MP for Westminster. He refused to do any campaigning except at the end, and he also wrote a public letter in which he declared he would not fight for local interests. Nevertheless, he was elected. In Parliament he had a more direct effect on the affairs of state which he had attempted to alter from afar through newspapers and journals, but his radicalism – however normal it seems to us today – did him no favours. He fought for the Irish, for the colonies – in short, he was true to his views. All of these, sadly, were minority views. After the conservatives found themselves under threat, they themselves campaigned more seriously in the next election and Mill was thrown out. He had been an MP for all of three years.

Concluding Remarks

Mill’s Autobiography was written, at least in part, with the goal also of thanking those in whose debt he was for his development. It is at times tedious to read all these names, most of whom are well-forgotten these days. The prose is also rather stodgy. And yet, in spite of all that, I’m rather glad I read it. Mill’s book is not one of those tell-all gossipy biographies, but instead it serves a far more important purpose. It justifies his other works by answering for the man behind them. It shows that his ideas came not just from the cool reasoning of a man behind his desk, but also from the warm-heartedness and appreciation for internal development that it took a crisis and deep friendship to create. It also provides a clear example of how utilitarian ideas can be compatible with a well-lived, ultimately passionate, life. Meanwhile, Mill’s political work shows how committed he was to the ideas of On Liberty.

In sum, Mill’s Autobiography enriches his other works by showing that he had worked and lived enough to write them from a wealth of experience alongside the rational calculation we might expect. I am very glad I read all three.

The Nihilistic Storytelling of Far Cry 2

Among other things, a good story is one that is effective. It aims at an effect and then employs various tools at its medium’s disposal to achieve it. I tend to see stories as reflecting a creator’s worldview, as making a certain argument about how we should see the world. I agree with the Soviet critic Mikhail Bakhtin, however, that there are certain times when a given work can reflect multiple worldviews, but these are rarer cases. Either way, a work is an argument about a worldview, whether with itself, or with the reader, or both. And a good work attempts to argue well.

Some stories are simply better told in certain mediums. Fiction has a great many limitations, just as much as do film or television, while also having its own advantages. The potential for videogames to tell good stories – and indeed, stories that can only be told well as videogames – has been overshadowed by the way that unfortunately most games don’t end up telling particularly impressive stories. Videogames are generally popular entertainment, and that’s absolutely fine. Like a good Marvel movie, there are a huge number of highly effective simple and fun games where committing acts of violence is pleasurable and “good” triumphs over “evil”. I enjoy playing those games as much as I enjoy watching Marvel’s offerings. And they sell like hotcakes.

But there are serious games – ones that strive for every bit as much moral complexity as do good works of literature, with every bit as much flair and depth. The best games combine an awareness of the medium’s limitations with a sense of its potential. Games suffer from an unavoidable problem – they have what is known as “gameplay”: the moments where the player is in control. The need to provide gameplay is generally what kills the effectiveness of a game’s story, rather than harmonising with it. This is particularly the case with shooting games.

“Ludonarrative dissonance” is the name that game designer Clint Hocking used to describe the problem. You play a game, with occasional cinematic intervals – cutscenes – where the story is expanded without player control. The dissonance that Hocking describes is when the impressions produced by the two parts – what the player controls as they play, and what they do not – contradict one another. In a shooting game one regularly massacres entire armies. At the end of a mission the game will then inject a little story, expecting us to care about some comrade who has fallen or some love interest we fight for. This really does not work. The character cannot be like that – not the one we have controlled thus far – they are coldblooded and soulless as we are while we control them. Their gameplay has ensured they must be like that. The cutscene feels like cheating, emotional manipulation. That’s because it generally is.

A similar problem exists in superhero movies – our heroes cannot feel okay from all that killing, not inside their heads at any rate. But the mental health effects of regularly murdering hundreds never crop up – in part, perhaps, because the heroes tend to kill aliens or other superpowered villains. When we do not kill a part of that whole to which we belong – humankind – there’s less possibility for reflection. In videogames these issues are harder to displace partly because of the obvious contradiction between what we do and what the game does for us (as cutscenes), partly because our enemies are people just as much as they are monsters, and partly because games have a particular talent at getting us to identify with and connect with our player characters. We control them, after all.

Games at their most interesting find a way of combining the stories they want to tell with the gameplay they use to tell it. And there is perhaps no better example of this than Ubisoft’s Far Cry 2.

Far Cry 2

As it happens, Clint Hocking was the creative director and scriptwriter for Far Cry 2, a videogame published by Ubisoft in 2008 and one which plays interestingly with these ideas of ludonarrative dissonance. Or rather, a game which refuses to play at all.

The game is set in Unnamed African Country, during a period of civil war sometime before the present day. The player is one of a selection of mercenaries from various countries with a history of armed conflict. Their goal is to hunt down the arms dealer known as The Jackal, whose guns have made the collapse of the country possible. Through working with the warlords of the two opposing factions, the player gradually accumulates titbits of information about The Jackal, until eventually they are in a position to locate him. On the side, the player interacts with other mercenaries, an underground movement attempting to help citizens escape the country, and a reporter trying to gather information on The Jackal for the world outside. There is nothing more to the story. Using an array of weapons, the player indiscriminately kills people to progress through the world.

Indeed, the plot is even more barebones than my description suggests. The supposed titbits about The Jackal which the player wants to get from the warlords never really materialise – instead, the player simply becomes a tool for their war against each other and, indirectly, the country itself. Whereas other games give missions with a sense of purpose, Far Cry 2 seems deliberately not to. We destroy oil pipelines, blow up bridges, cut off food and medical supplies to the vulnerable population. Most of the missions involve some sort of war crime. This is not standard territory for games – at least, they always try to gloss over the war crimes! Far Cry 2 doesn’t care – that’s what is so impressive. It doesn’t even condemn them – it’s less immoral than amoral. The feeling is less of a naughty pleasure in doing bad than a weary disappointment at the impossibility of doing good.

Progress for the player consists in unlocking new weapons. Since the plot doesn’t really go forward the only sense of change is the player’s increased ability to murder. We have to ask ourselves what the value of all this is. We follow the game’s suggestions, doing missions, expanding our arsenal. But instead of stopping the war, we only make it worse. The game’s second act finds us in a new province in the country, where a ceasefire has been agreed between the factions. Our first mission there consists of breaking down the ceasefire by ourselves bringing a new shipment of weapons into the province’s capital. We must become an arms dealer to kill an arms dealer – the logic somehow isn’t quite there.

The characters are empty too, amoral freaks. They are simply warlords and underlings. Overheard dialogue consists of characters planning their next murders and nothing besides. In addition to the arms deliveries, we help assassinate the warlords so that their deputies can take power. But there is nothing of consequence that comes from this except another mission to do, another hundred men to kill. We lose our hope in positive change. Our actions at every turn are denied value, significance, meaning. Our choices consist of determining the order we do missions, and our precise approach once the mission begins – do we light a fire with a flamethrower, use a sniper rifle from a distance, or go in on a truck, guns blazing? The game is mechanically sound – it’s a pleasure to engage in such destruction and we want more. The physics for fire in particular were well ahead of their time.

Our desire for killing is at least compensated in most games by a sense that we are doing the right thing. We are saving the world from aliens or fighting for those that we love. Far Cry 2 offers nothing of the sort. It offers only the possibility of sating our bloodlust without any kind of soothing of the pangs of conscience that same bloodlust might be connected to. Another brilliant game of that era, Spec Ops: The Line, problematizes the player’s desire for violence by having the main character become increasingly unhinged as the game progresses, visibly rejoicing in the killing of his enemies. Far Cry 2 is a first-person-shooter, so we see through our character’s eyes. We do not hear them – they do not speak. Silence – the eerie absence of any decent justification for our actions – is the tool by which the game works upon us.

Early on in the game’s second act, after we have restarted the civil war, we find ourselves in the mercenary bar outside of the city which serves as a kind of safe haven for the player. I left it and began walking towards my next mission location. As I did so, I noticed on my map markings suggesting nearby buildings. Outside of the cities, such markings indicate a guard outpost in Far Cry 2. By killing the men, I would gain data for my map about the local area, and possibly find some rough (blood) diamonds, which are used as the game’s currency. I approached over a hill, my assault rifle at the ready.

But there was nothing, nobody, there. Instead, there were rows and rows of graves. Fresh, hasty, wooden crosses marked the places where men and women were buried. I had arrived at a sacred place with the intent to kill and a weapon in my hand. I discovered that I was, to all intents and purposes, a monster. And the game in that moment forced me to confront that terrible fact. This is environmental storytelling at its very best – and environmental storytelling is what makes games very special as a medium for telling stories. I had stumbled upon this for myself – I was in control, and so I was responsible. Just as I had killed hundreds of people without thinking, now I was made to feel that. And all of this in complete silence.

The Jackal, our arms dealer, meets us occasionally, whenever we are otherwise incapacitated. He gives speeches and mocks us. He quotes Nietzsche, but unlike when angsty teens butcher the philosopher, The Jackal’s willingness to quote maxims about the world’s violence and valuelessness are far more poignant. The Jackal has power, and he has adopted a terrible worldview to justify using it in the most horrific ways. Never mind that Nietzsche spends most of his books specifically arguing against the suggestion that there is nothing in life beyond increasing one’s power in the sense of violence and control over others. What matters is that the game presents us with a character who believes something – with a voice, however horrific, that seems to have thought behind it. And a voice, well made, is a worldview and an argument for that worldview.

At the end of the game the player ends up working with The Jackal. The Jackal talks a lot about disease and contagion. He sees the violence his weapons have made possible as something inevitable in the world and not his responsibility. He thinks it is something that must be isolated and exterminated. Together with the player he works to get the last of the refugees out of the country, with both of player and Jackal dying in the process. With the refugees free, all that remains is for the soldiers left behind to shoot each other until nobody is left and peace can once again dawn.

Far Cry 2 presents The Jackal as an antagonist, but the game does nothing to challenge his worldview. Instead, it draws the player into it, making them complicit in the same acts of brutal and pointless violence that The Jackal is supposedly responsible for, and no different from all the soldiers and warlords supplied by him. We kill for little reason – there’s no reward except (blood) diamonds, which can only be exchanged for weapons. The Jackal’s own weapons. The missions neither bring us tangibly closer to stopping him, nor tangibly closer to resolving the civil war.

Occasionally, in a loading screen, we get a feel for what the character thinks – our only suggestion of any kind of interiority on their part. But what we read only reinforces the game’s suggestion about the world. Here’s an example: “It wasn’t so long ago that this was another one of those dirty little wars that barely rated a sidebar. There was an arms embargo in place, and everyone back home could just cluck their tongues and plan their next tax-deductible donation…” Instead of trying to give us a likeable player character, the game gives us a mercenary – in other words, someone who doesn’t care. And since the player’s character doesn’t care or find any value in the world, we – the player – cannot find that value either, try as we might.

There is no ludonarrative dissonance in Far Cry 2 because the meaningless violence of the player’s actions is the game’s argument about the world. The world (of this kind of civil war), it suggests, is valueless and brutal. There is nothing to hold on to. There is no good, and the only pleasure comes in destruction. It’s an argument that is compellingly made because the player feels it. For we only play the game because the destruction is good – the game strips away any other worthy motivations from us.

We may disagree with the picture of the world that the game proposes – I certainly would like to – but that is to miss the point. There are two reasons for thinking, as I have for so many years, about Far Cry 2 – the first is that it is a fascinating example of how games can harmonise the stories they want to tell along with the tools they employ to tell them. The other reason is that as I wrote at the beginning, any piece of art is an argument about the world, and I think a responsible human being should engage with as many well-put arguments as possible. Far Cry 2’s argument, like those we find in Joseph Conrad (a key influence on the game) or Cormac McCarthy, is disagreeable but it is not bad. Unfortunately, it often explains the world all too well…

Anyway, I finally finished the game earlier this year, after a great many failed attempts, and I thought it deserved the piece.