Tag: Pessimism

The Death of the Black Hen

It was lucky I was at my desk or else I wouldn’t have seen them. Two foxes, big ones, and ahead of them flapping, hurtling, racing, mad as a damaged missile – the white hen. By the time I had unbolted the front door, they had had several seconds to continue their attack unimpeded. I was roaring monstrously, but far too slow to deal any damage – the foxes fled before I lay my hands on them. I chased them as far as the tall grass, but then I had to turn back.

The white hen was in the boiler room, buried in a corner with her back to the door. Perhaps she didn’t want to see her end if it was coming. Or perhaps she retained that childish notion that what she could not see, could not see her either. I picked her up and took her to the hen house, locking her in the enclosure. She was hurt, but less badly than I had thought. Her feathers littered the drive, but her attackers had not drawn blood.

I went to find the black hen.

I went through the garden, up and down the drive, and across the front lawn. I found feathers, a lot of them, on the path by the firepit. I found also the little hollow the foxes had made under the wire fence going into the undergrowth. I followed it, and as I advanced something moved ahead of me, retreated still further into the deep green darkness. But I came across a clearing covered in black feathers and I understood that I had come far too late.

Many of the pessimists whom I wrote about last week asked whether life was a good or a bad thing, all considered. One thought experiment they conducted was to ask who would be willing to live their life through again. The answer, they concluded sadly, was few of us. We may have plenty of pleasures and happiness in our time upon the earth, but when we consider the pains – grief, sorrow, illness – we find that they far outweigh the former in intensity, even if in quantity they may be evenly matched.

The girls

Our hens lived good lives. They had a huge area to roam, customers who did not insist on eggs – for neither myself nor my brother actually like them all that much – and food and water and love and warmth. Last year the smaller of the two black hens died of an illness, leaving us with just the big black one and the white one. And now the white one is all alone.

It’s funny the things that a death like this makes you think of. It’s funny really, that it can get to you at all. But I felt guilt, a lot of it, and still do in my way. Earlier that morning I had heard the hens, and I had thought then that it was simply the triumphant clucking of a successful egg-laying operation. But perhaps that had been a cry for help that I had missed.

When a friend visited, he told how all of his hens let him take them in his arms. Ours were much less affectionate. But still, you knew that they loved us. The white hen always let you stroke her if you insisted. And after the small black hen died the big black hen finally let us stroke her too.

More so than a pet, even, you feel a lot of responsibility for something like a hen. A cat or a dog has no real natural predators, at least in restive rural England. We cannot be at fault if an accident occurs because we have done our best. But with hens, it is a different matter. We could never have let them out, to begin with, we could have guarded them more carefully, and so on. Here, responsibility feels more firmly placed upon our shoulders.

Hens have personalities, you come to realise. Secretly, we’re glad that the white one survived because she is bossy boots and a real character. She is always bothering us. She comes and pecks my shins if her food is even a minute late in coming. She is always the most deranged, the wildest, and for all that the most human of the birds we had.

She survived a fox attack earlier in the year too. That was while I was away in Russia. She spent a week living in a little box on the side in the kitchen, and then went back to her business as normal. I am home alone, and boxes in the kitchen are beyond me, but I have brought her food and water, had various discussions and heart-to-hearts with her, and cleaned out her house. I even made her rice, which I was told is a particular delicacy among hens – and she ate the whole pan’s worth.

She limps now, but after a day spent hiding in the hen house, she now comes out into the larger hen run again and hobbles about. She is laying again and already talks. After the attack I was struck by how quiet she was – the only noise she made was terrible, heavy breathing. Understandable, given the circumstances, but so strange to hear coming from her when she is normally so chatty.

All this is to say that I was struck by how human she was. This is an obvious point, but still worth stating. In the relationship you have with these animals in your care they perhaps remain as animals – loved, but not quite fully human. And here the little hen was like a little child.

But the foxes were human too. This was the thing that shook me: the look in their eyes. There was something human about it, but not in any positive sense. We may, from Roald Dahl’s Fantastic Mr Fox or else cute pictures on the internet, assume that all foxes are rascals with hearts of gold. Like wolves, we may secretly admire them. But these two foxes had a look of hatred, human hatred, in their eyes, mixed with what can only be described as bloodlust. They hated me because I had arrived and driven them off and in doing so had deprived them of their kill. And although I am often annoying, never have I seen that look directed at me. Never have I felt the full force of another’s desire to see hurt come to me, never until then. It is not a feeling I’d like to feel again.

The white hen will recover. She is a fighter, after all. When I was talking about the attack with our gardener, she told me a story about another house she had worked on which also had hens and also was the site of a tragedy. In this place, the hens, about twenty of them, roamed on a field with a pond in the middle. They were rescue hens, taken from battery farms – jittery, nervous, and undersized creatures who have experienced more than their fair share of suffering. But one day two foxes got into their field too, and it was a massacre. Every single hen was slaughtered, all but one. As the others were being ripped and torn apart, she had gone to the pond and flown in. She had gone against her nature out of an instinct for survival that even the battery farms had not extinguished. In a way, it’s inspiring.

Looking particularly like a white onion in this one.

Schopenhauer has a famous example to illustrate the truth of his pessimism. He notes that “one simple test of the claim that the pleasure in the world outweighs the pain… is to compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of the animal being devoured.” This is something we instinctively agree with (though as proof of pessimism it probably does not convince us), but I really felt its truth after saving the white hen. The fear, the terror of her eyes – and she had survived. How much more would the black hen have suffered, I can only guess. And all that for a tasty meal that would be forgotten soon enough. A soul extinguished for a full belly. The scales are not in balance, that’s for sure. But then again, neither the eater not the eaten is given much to philosophising. This is just nature at work.

The thought experiment, would you be willing to live your life again, is an old one. Nietzsche turned it around into a positive guide with his da capo (“let’s do it all again”) attitude, saying that the potential for eternally repeating your life should be the guide for how you live it. In the case of pessimists, they answered that we would not wish to live our lives again, and our certainty in this would only grow as we got older. Illness and grief are things the experience of which is simply too great, they argue, to let us want to see the other things. Mara Van der Lugt in her book, however, notes that the experiment uses a kind of sleight-of-hand. If asked whether we wanted to play our lives through exactly as they were, perhaps we would say no. But if we were asked whether we wanted simply to live again, then many more of us would say yes. No matter how well lived, our lives will always lack novelty to one who has already lived them. But a new life, with new pain and new joy, probably tips the scales towards life being something worth experiencing.

But still, would the hens choose to live again? Two or three years of roaming the garden, the drive, the fields, pecking at me and the ground, pestering the gardener and my mother, but ending up being literally ripped limb from limb. Would they choose that?

Our lives are unlikely to end in us being ripped limb from limb. But one thing that has stuck with me after the attack was how unnecessary violence is for us as human beings. We do not need to rely on the suffering of humans and other animals to get our food, our water, our clothing, and our shelter. That we do is simply a reflection of our generally inadequate attempts to build a better world. But still, it must be possible. Whereas for these wild foxes, at least for the moment, a reason not to eat our hens is not going to be forthcoming. All our feathered friends and we, their carers, can do is be extra vigilant.

When I went to see the white hen this most recent time, she was already racing to the door out from her hen run into the world, even with her limp. I have decided that she is no longer a symbol of a willingness to fight to live against the odds. Instead, dear readers, she is simply as thick as beans.

Mara van der Lugt’s Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering

The words “pessimism” and “depression” are not, in fact, the same. They share some things – like the double “s” in the middle – but not everything. Philosophical pessimism is still more different from depression than its everyday own-brand pessimistic cousin, the one that we normally talk about when we use the word. Mara van der Lugt’s book, Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering, provides a fascinating exploration of the origins of philosophical pessimism and its development throughout the early modern period, ending with Schopenhauer himself. She shows that serious engagement with pessimism and earthly suffering was born out of a seriousengagement with theodicy – the discipline of trying to work out how a perfectly powerful, good, and knowledgeable God could create such a miserable sod as yours truly.

Ranging through optimists as well as pessimists, she shows how the latter especially are driven by “a deep and widely shared concern over how to speak truthfully, meaningfully, and compassionately about human (and sometimes even animal suffering)”. Where the two groups differ fundamentally is in their perspective, with the optimists adopting a “cosmic” or large-scale perspective, and the pessimists adopting a microscopic but not unimportant one that is the human heart – the “creaturely” point of view.

For van der Lugt, pessimism is not fundamentally a question about the future – whether things will get better, or whether we have no reason to believe that will be the case. She argues compellingly that such questions of the future arose out of considering the present, which she calls “value pessimism” to distinguish it from “future orientated” pessimism. This type of pessimism is not about deciding whether life is worth living, but about weighing it up – are we faced with more unhappiness than happiness in our time upon the earth?

Throughout, she demonstrates that pessimism “does not want to be a philosophy of despair”, and certainly needn’t be. Instead, she argues that it is capable at its best of giving “due weight to the suffering of others” in a way that optimism rarely does. “At its best, it is a philosophy of fragility, sensitivity, compassion, and consolation; at its worst, it is callous in its own way and ruins us for joy by telling us that it is impossible.” Although the thinkers we read about stretch from Pierre Bayle in the 17th century to Schopenhauer in the 19th, the philosophy that emerges is one that is strikingly modern in its attitudes and wholly relevant in its approach.

I cannot pretend to summarise wholly van der Lugt’s book. Nor would I want to, for it really is entertaining and well written. Nor could I, because there is a chapter on Kant that went down in my brain about as well as the last time I attempted to read him. But I will share what I found interesting.

Questions of pessimism grew out of the problem of evil. The classic formulation by Epicurus is as follows: Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is God able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then where does evil come from?

Here we are, we God-fearers, perplexed. At least many people have been, for many hundreds of years. Originally, the major issue was “natural” or “physical” evils. The Earthquake of Lisbon in the 18th century killed a great many people and could not really be explained in any satisfying way. Individual suffering was easier to deal with. Augustine divided the world’s ills into sin and the punishment for it. Any pain we suffered was the punishment for something or other. This too didn’t always leave people feeling satisfied, as far as explanations go. And in fact, his dictum that “under a just God no one can be miserable unless they deserve to be” seems these days rather to provide an argument that God was unjust – not what the old saint had in mind.

Individual suffering is a problem though, and van der Lugt’s book traces the intricacies of explanations and counter explanations for what the significance and meaning of that suffering might be. Pierre Bayle, for example, was the first thinker to consider mental suffering as just as important as bodily suffering. Voltaire, Hume, and Rousseau are the major names, although there are some lesser-known ones too, such as William Warburton and Malebranche. As the years go by we see God retreat, and various methods attempt to weigh good and evil on the scales.

Perhaps the most interesting trend is the expansion of the idea of what evil is, or at least of what kind of suffering is problematic. Two points stand out. The first is the suffering of animals, which Schopenhauer famously cared about. The second is the appreciation for the way that your disposition (or, today, brain chemistry) may leave you inclined towards suffering, no matter how good your life may be on paper. Whereas once it was just harm, like being hurt physically, and then it was mental hurt, now even the increased capacity for mental hurt becomes a problem for a just and kind God.

Though Schopenhauer makes a good go of it, arguments for pessimism tend not to be hugely rigorous – they go from personal experience backwards, no matter how many times we may toss around such highfaluting language as the “will” and its striving. Too often is it the case that an argument can simply be dispelled by saying “but you are looking at this wrong”. A friend comes to you and says the world is dark and evil; you tell him to go outside and smell the wet grass and all will be well. Neither of you is wrong. Everyone’s intuitions as to the world’s deeper state come from the soul, and it is locked to others, perhaps keylessly. Compendiums of suffering can only confirm what we already think. Horror shocks, but it rarely convinces. We can always withdraw to our own perspective and disarm it if that is our inclination.

Perhaps that is why the best arguments for pessimism are unsystematic, unphilosophical even – they are literary, artistic. We cannot trust that we see the same real world as everyone else. This goes for its essential goodness just as much as it goes for what colour green actually is. But with a work of art, its creator has much more scope to control the perspective we are given upon the “world”. We cannot draw back and approach matters differently because our access to them comes only one word at a time, from a fixed view. Some of us spend the most blessed days of our lives interpreting art, but these interpretations are limited by the material. We can argue that the raw beauty of Cormac McCarthy’s fiction is redemptive, but we cannot argue that his work is optimistic or cheery.

Fiction pessimism, as with any argument about the world, suffocates alternate impulses so that as we collapse on our beds, the book tumbling out of our hands, we realise the only valid way of looking at things. (Bakhtin would argue that there are certain kaleidoscopic authorial exceptions, but even he would agree with me that they are the exceptions to the rule). Luckily, the world disproves the argument soon enough once we get back to it. We always return to whatever we want to see, to our own perspective. But because the best arguments for pessimism in philosophy still tend to be based on appeals to experience, we may as well go for that approach which seems to be best at transferring experience to its full intensity. Which, we may hate to admit it, probably isn’t a monograph.  

There are very few books on pessimism being published in the academic world. As a philosophy, it suffers from an overreliance on what we see and experience for ourselves and the conclusions we draw as individuals. The only other book I have come across was Joshua Foa Dienstag’s Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit, published in 2006. Funnily enough, Dienstag’s book and van der Lugt’s have very little overlap in thinkers, with Dienstag’s focus being on later writers like Unamuno, Nietzsche, Freud and Cioran. Moreover, amusingly, they both disagree about Rousseau – with Dienstag calling him the founder of pessimism, and van der Lugt calling him an optimist! Both of them agree, however, that pessimism can be a source of strength. I recall from my own, alas, all-too-brief study of Schopenhauer how much beauty, consolation, and compassion I found in his work.

And actually, the comparative absence of attention being paid to this topic and some of these thinkers is itself, in a way, a good thing. Discovery is always tainted by the feeling you are stepping onto a terra that is very much cognita. Whereas when we sense that we are striking out alone, there is a truly wonderful intimacy – allow me to link to my translation of Baratinsky’s short poem on the topic. (Speaking of which, Baratinsky is often compared to the great Italian poet-pessimist Leopardi, for those of you interested in exploring pessimism’s poetic and literary manifestations further). This intimacy is important because it loosens the nuts of the soul and makes us more receptive, and receptivity is precisely what we need for arguments that encourage us to be more compassionate.

Vander Lugt finishes her book with a short but wonderful chapter considering the potential value of pessimism now. Its approach to compassion, to seeing everyone upon the world as suffering in some sense, broadens our horizons in a way that is not constrained by earthly concerns such as culture, race, or the other identifiers. This care-driven approach is also relevant when we regard the suffering of animals as important, which Schopenhauer did, and the suffering of future generations. In this sense, pessimism is anti-individualistic and conservative in the best of ways.

Van der Lugt also brings up our culture’s occasionally mindless promotion of mindfulness as one area where pessimism can provide an alternative view of things. If we say that happiness is up to us, we are also saying that our unhappiness is up to us. This “overburdening of the will” leaves us feeling guilty when we aren’t happy, which only makes us more miserable. The pessimist view that some of us are simply not lucky with our constitutions and unable to be as happy as the rest says that we aren’t fully to blame for being unhappy and shouldn’t beat ourselves up about it. This is more likely to be what a sad person wants to hear than that it’s their fault they’re miserable.

And speaking of which, if it’s up to us to sort out our happiness, why should we care about others who suffer to begin with? After all, they are failing to make the right choices, to be mindful and meditate for ten minutes before breakfast or what-have-you. Thus mindfulness, rather than being a positive happy-making approach, can sometimes distance us from others and make us still more depressed. At least when it’s not mediated by an awareness that some problems are not always in our heads, and that sometimes sadness is a legitimate response to the things life throws at us. But sadness, we probably should agree, cannot be a mode of life. We need tools to return to the world, and serious pessimism of the sort van der Lugt describes can be just as effective as in this as mindfulness, and indeed can successfully coexist alongside it.

This all seems to me to be reasonable. As always seems to happen, the truth seems rather boringly to be one of compromise. We are partly responsible for our happiness, but not entirely. This world is full of misery, but not entirely. We must be more caring – this alone is always true. Still, pessimism, and by extension van der Lugt’s book, is valuable precisely because it provides a counterweight to the more optimistic approach that is culturally dominant among us. That her writing is lucid and a pleasure to read is a bonus for which we should all be grateful.